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  2. Hi, I'm Susanna Hecht. I'm a Professor at
  3. UCLA, and I'm the Director of the Brazil
  4. Center there. Right now, in this next
  5. chapter, we're going to look at the
  6. background to modern development. It
  7. really goes from, sort of, earlier times——
  8. particularly, the military times——to about
  9. 1964, through to the end of the
  10. military period. It's important to
  11. remember that for most of the 20th century,
  12. Brazil was under military rule. So, when
  13. we think about Amazonia, it's useful to
  14. think about a kind of "military
  15. developmentalism." First of all, that
  16. there's always been geopolitics in there;
  17. the scramble for the Amazon goes on for
  18. hundreds of years between Spain and
  19. Portugal. The key idea is that of Roman
  20. law, which is called "uti possidetis"——"he who
  21. has, keeps." So, in this sense, you can kind
  22. of understand the pressures for
  23. colonialism going on. The second thing is
  24. that "kings make maps, and maps make kings."
  25. So, there's a lot of strategic mapping
  26. and survey groups going through, and,
  27. essentially, the military concerns are
  28. fundamental. So, it's important to
  29. understand that for most of its history,
  30. Amazonia was of concern to its nation states,
  31. primarily for military reasons; yes, there
  32. was gold and other stuff coming out of
  33. it, but the military orientation in the
  34. geopolitics was really important. Also,
  35. the ideology of the "March to the West,"
  36. particularly in the early part of the
  37. 20th century, becomes central to thinking
  38. about Amazonia and incorporating
  39. Amazonia, and the interior, more generally
  40. into the concept of the nation state. As
  41. historians will tell you, most of the
  42. history of South America is so-called
  43. "coastal history," rather than the more
  44. central——for our interests——interior
  45. history. So, Amazonia has been a
  46. globalized space for a long time; it's
  47. been a militarized space; and it's been a
  48. space of conflict, both between
  49. Indigenous populations, various kinds of
  50. nations, and other kinds of dynamics,
  51. including the Cold War and European
  52. structural changes. One of the things
  53. that is important to keep in mind––and
  54. we're now moving forward here––
  55. modernization, authoritarian high
  56. modernism, and military developmentalism
  57. to about 1984. So, there's
  58. been this history that I just mentioned
  59. of constant military concern. What we
  60. start to see at this juncture is that
  61. Amazonia becomes a central question for
  62. the military regime. No sooner do they
  63. take power then the next day, they
  64. essentially come out with an Amazonian
  65. program. So, it has has been a worry that
  66. Amazonian military theorists have
  67. thought about for a long time, and they
  68. come prepared. One of the things that's
  69. important, and has been important all
  70. along through the 20th century, is the
  71. development of infrastructure. So, what we
  72. see in this is an emphasis, immediately,
  73. on expanding infrastructure. So, this
  74. means the development of the Trans-
  75. Amazon Highway, and, also, we begin to
  76. start to see the interest in the western
  77. Amazon, with BR-
  78. 364. What's important to understand about
  79. this, too, is that there's this idea of
  80. "growth pole development," so, there's
  81. investment in key sectors linked by
  82. infrastructure. Those growth pole
  83. activities are highly subsidized; you'll
  84. be amazed to hear that these involved
  85. mostly livestock and mining, but there's
  86. also another piece of this, which is the
  87. use of Amazonia as a safety valve for
  88. pressure for agrarian reform. So, one of
  89. the things that's important to keep in
  90. mind here is that we have sort of three
  91. central things: infrastructure; growth
  92. poles——mining and livestock, for the most
  93. part, at this point; and then, third,
  94. agrarian reform. So, these become the
  95. dynamics. These roads go
  96. in, and the March to the West becomes
  97. really important. It's a national
  98. ambition; it's national integration.
  99. What's important to keep in mind here is
  100. that they imagined the place empty——that
  101. is, a "tabula rasa" on which they could do
  102. whatever they want; it was the call of
  103. the "virgin lands." And, of course, this was
  104. appealing, not just to the military, but
  105. it was also legitimizing for this
  106. military regime. What you see here is a
  107. sort of blackened landscape on one side
  108. and the forest on the other. And while
  109. we see it that way, this important
  110. drawing from an Indigenous person
  111. basically shows an Indigenous version of
  112. this, which isn't just the logs and the
  113. machinery, but rather all the animals and
  114. all the creatures that are lost in this
  115. process of large-scale transformation.
  116. It's this large-scale transformation and
  117. the kinds of losses that occur——and the
  118. fact that there were Indigenous people,
  119. traditional people, and so on——that begin
  120. to also
  121. trigger a huge outcry against the
  122. military strategy, the top-down strategy
  123. of occupying this place without
  124. attention to the other living creatures,
  125. without attention to the other complex
  126. societies that could be found there, and
  127. the other kinds of histories that might
  128. imply a different kind of future. So,
  129. it's important to keep in mind that when
  130. we look at military developmentalism,
  131. it has three big ideas:
  132. (1) infrastructure; (2) subsidized, large-scale,
  133. and agrarian reform; (3) and almost total
  134. indifference to environment. What happens,
  135. of course, is that they aren't
  136. coming to an empty land; they're coming
  137. to a very full and complex land, and then
  138. there is a global outcry. And it becomes
  139. so intense, and so problematic, that the
  140. questions of human rights, the questions
  141. of environment, the questions of the form
  142. of development, come under review, and
  143. this is part of the pressure that
  144. undermines, eventually, the continuation
  145. of the dictatorship, with a kind of
  146. dramatic moment in which Indigenous
  147. insurgent citizenship of various kinds
  148. and international concerns over
  149. environment collided with a national
  150. critique of the problems of military
  151. developmentalism. This produced a new
  152. constitution in 1988, which was
  153. landmark and, in fact, widely imitated
  154. elsewhere throughout Latin America. What
  155. does it do? It involves the expansion of
  156. rights and resources——that is, people who
  157. were previously disenfranchised, who had no
  158. political role, find that political role,
  159. and also find it in light of control
  160. over new forms of territory, and also in
  161. a really single important thing:
  162. emphasize the importance of environment,
  163. and even things like the rights of
  164. nature——the Pachamama, as it's said,
  165. as it's described in the Andes. These
  166. new forms of rights and rethinking are
  167. really important for regional processes,
  168. particularly as they moved into the 20th
  169. century. It's the rights of nature——the
  170. Pachamama. It's also a recognition of
  171. new forms of citizenship, so that you
  172. start to see Quilombos, Indigenous people,
  173. traditional people, and other people
  174. who've been disenfranchised taking on
  175. new roles in trying to structure their
  176. own history, as well as the history of
  177. the nation. So, Amazonians, who had been
  178. extremely marginalized, start to move
  179. into positions of importance and also,
  180. intellectually and politically, they take
  181. on a new weight. This is extremely
  182. important, and it results in the creation
  183. of a number of new institutions. We have
  184. to understand that state formation
  185. involves creating new institutions——it's
  186. not just people being active or being
  187. concerned about things. We have the rise
  188. of civil society, but also we have the
  189. rise of new kinds of institutions. These
  190. include a number of activities——the
  191. creation of environmental agencies,
  192. the creation of the ability to
  193. surveil, a lot of monitoring of
  194. deforestation, and other kinds of things.
  195. But these also occur in light of a
  196. larger structural change that has to do
  197. with the rise of neoliberalism. So, while
  198. state formation involves a lot of civil
  199. society and actual institutions of the
  200. state, what is also happening——and you can
  201. sort of see why because, actually, at the
  202. time this was occurring, the
  203. authoritarian state no longer really
  204. existed, and civil society hadn't evolved
  205. very much——but what we see, then, is a kind
  206. of market-led, export-led development. And
  207. this basically involves neoliberal
  208. reforms, which is largely contained in
  209. privatization, much more open markets,
  210. more open to international capital and
  211. finance, and export-led development, which
  212. has always been historically important,
  213. as we've discussed, but which becomes
  214. much more important. The other thing
  215. that's often overlooked in these
  216. discussions is what I call, and what is
  217. generally called, the "China shock," which
  218. is, as China moves into international
  219. markets, and is open, and these areas have
  220. opened up, what happens is that the
  221. industrial and manufacturing bases of
  222. the Amazonian countries become
  223. extremely uncompetitive globally, and
  224. even nationally, because of the cheap and
  225. excellent Chinese goods. So, one
  226. problem is that what had been sort of
  227. the option for development——which was
  228. manufacturing in certain kinds of
  229. industry——are overridden to some
  230. degree by the "China shock." One other
  231. problem with this is the emergence of petrostates.
  232. You don't, maybe, think of Amazonia
  233. as being centrally engaged in
  234. petroleum and other kinds of
  235. hydrocarbons, but it has been, actually,
  236. since the 1920s. What's important to
  237. realize is that there are massive
  238. hydrocarbon deposits throughout
  239. Amazonia, along the, sort of, foothills of
  240. the Andes and then also on the ocean
  241. areas. So, what has happened is that
  242. oil development, which is very high-tech
  243. and does not create a lot of jobs——even
  244. though it creates a lot of money and a
  245. lot of opportunities for corruption——
  246. becomes a kind of "oil curse." It also is
  247. highly polluting, and, so, in the context
  248. of trying to change things in terms of
  249. climate change, expanding oil production
  250. more generally is really a problem. The
  251. problem that also emerges with this
  252. is that there really aren't that many
  253. other important alternatives——and,
  254. also, the opportunities for corruption
  255. are so delirious that it becomes a kind
  256. of seductive sector, and this, of course,
  257. has driven several
  258. several nations into a lot of
  259. political trouble and a lot of
  260. corruption problems in the national
  261. State. So, it's important to realize that
  262. Amazonia has, sort of, what is called
  263. "the oil curse," which is also part of this
  264. expanding, new Amazonia that we're
  265. starting to look at.
  266. [Music]
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