

15.071x – The Analytics Edge

### Airline Regulation (1938-1978)

- The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) set fares, routes, and schedules for all interstate air transport
- Most major airlines favored this system due to guaranteed profits
- Led to inefficiency and higher costs
  - Applications for new routes and fares often delayed or dismissed

### Airline Deregulation (1978)

- The administration of President Jimmy Carter passed the Airline Deregulation Act in 1978
- The Act encouraged
  - More competition: 52 new airlines between 1980 and 2000
  - New air routes: saved passengers an estimated \$10.3 billion each year in travel time
  - Lower fares: ticket prices are 40% lower today than they were in 1978
- This led to more passengers
  - The number of air passengers increased from 207.5 million in 1974 to 721.1 million in 2010

# A Competitive Edge

- More competition led to heavy losses by air carriers
  - Need to lower fares while meeting operating costs
- 9 major carriers and more than 100 smaller airlines went bankrupt between 1978 and 2002
- How did airlines compete?

#### Discount Fares

- On January 17, 1985 American Airlines (AA) launched its Ultimate Super Saver fares to compete with PeopleExpress
- Need to fill at least a minimum number of seats without selling every seat at discount prices
  - Sell enough seats to cover fixed operating costs
  - Sell remaining seats at higher rates to maximize revenues/profits

#### How Many Seats to Sell on Discount?

- Passengers have different valuations
  - Business people value flexibility (last-minute/refundable)
  - People seeking getaways value good deals (early birds)
- Sell too many discounted seats
  - Not enough seats for high-paying passengers
- Sell too few discounted seats
  - Empty seats at takeoff implying lost revenue
- How should AA allocate its seats among customers to maximize its revenue?

### Let's Start Simple



#### Ticket Prices



### Boeing 757-200 Seat Map

• 166 Economy seats



### Demand Forecasting

- Demand for different prices can be forecasted using analytics tools, looking at historical data and incorporating models of human behavior
  - Time series methods
  - Linear regression
- Forecasts could be erroneous
  - Need to assess sensitivity to forecast errors
- We'll assume that demand has been forecasted

## Myopic Solution

|     |          | Price | Demand | Seats to Sell |          |
|-----|----------|-------|--------|---------------|----------|
| JFK | Regular  | 617   | 50     | 50            | Capacity |
| LAX | Discount | 238   | 150    | 116           | 166      |

• How many discount seats to sell to maximize revenue?

## Myopic Solution

|     |          | Price | Demand | Seats to Sell |          |
|-----|----------|-------|--------|---------------|----------|
| JFK | Regular  | 617   | 100    | 100           | Capacity |
| LAX | Discount | 238   | 150    | 66            | 166      |

• How many discount seats to sell to maximize revenue?

# Myopic Solution

|     |          | Price | Demand | Seats to Sell |          |
|-----|----------|-------|--------|---------------|----------|
| JFK | Regular  | 617   | 200    | 166           | Capacity |
| LAX | Discount | 238   | 150    | 0             | 166      |

- How many discount seats to sell to maximize revenue?
- This seems simple, but what if we had 100 different flights?
- In the next video, we'll see how to formulate this mathematically

## Single Route Example



- Problem: Find the optimal number of discounted seats and regular seats to sell to maximize revenue
- Let's formulate the problem mathematically

### Step 1. Decisions



- What are our decisions?
  - Number of regular seats to sell -R
  - Number of discount seats to sell -D

## Step 2. Objective



- What is our objective?
  - Maximizing total airline revenue
  - Revenue from each type of seat is equal to the number of that type of seat sold times the seat price

#### Max (617\*R + 238\*D)

### Step 3. Constraints



- AA cannot sell more seats than the aircraft capacity
  - Total number of seats sold cannot exceed capacity  $R+D \leq 166$
- AA cannot sell more seats than the demand
  - Regular seats sold cannot exceed 100  $R \leq 100$
  - Discount seats sold cannot exceed 150  $b \le 150$

### Step 4. Non-Negativity



• AA cannot sell a negative number of seats  $R \ge 0$   $D \ge 0$ 

### Problem Formulation



Maximize Total airline revenue Subject to Seats sold cannot exceed capacity Seats sold cannot exceed demand Seats sold cannot be negative

#### Problem Formulation



Maximize 617R + 238DSubject to  $R + D \le 166$  $R \le 100, D \le 150$  $R \ge 0, D \ge 0$ 





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#### Feasible Space



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### Possible Solutions



- Revenue 617R + 238D
- How many seats to sell of each type to achieve a revenue of
  - \$20,000?
  - \$40,000?
  - \$60,000?

#### Best Solution



- Revenue 617R + 238D
- How many seats to sell of each type to achieve the highest revenue possible?

### Marketing Decisions

• Management is trying to figure out whether it would be beneficial to invest in marketing its fares

• AA forecasts that its marketing effort is likely to attract one more unit of demand per **\$200 spent** 

|               | Marketing Cost/unit | Marginal Revenue |
|---------------|---------------------|------------------|
| Discount Fare | \$200               |                  |
| Regular Fare  | \$200               |                  |

### Marketing Discount Fares



### Marketing Discount Fares



### Marketing Discount Fares



- "Shadow Price"
  - Marginal revenue of increasing discount demand by 1 unit
  - **ZERO** for discount demand greater than 66

### Marketing Regular Fares



### Marketing Regular Fares



### Marketing Decisions

• Management is trying to figure out whether it would be beneficial to invest in marketing its fares

• AA forecasts that its marketing effort is likely to attract one more unit of demand per **\$200 spent** 

|               | Marketing Cost/unit | Marginal Revenue |
|---------------|---------------------|------------------|
| Discount Fare | \$200               | 0                |
| Regular Fare  | \$200               | \$379            |

Capacity Allocation

 Management is trying to figure out whether it would be beneficial to allocate a bigger aircraft for the 6 hour JFK-LAX leg

|                   | Cost/hr  | Total Cost | Seats | Revenue  |
|-------------------|----------|------------|-------|----------|
| Original Aircraft | \$12,067 | \$72,402   | 166   | \$77,408 |
| Boeing 757-200    | \$12,765 | \$76,590   | 176   |          |
| Boeing 767-300    | \$14,557 | \$87,342   | 218   |          |

### Aircraft Capacity



Capacity Allocation

 Management is trying to figure out whether it would be beneficial to allocate a bigger aircraft for the 6 hour JFK-LAX leg

|                   | Total Cost | Revenue  | Profit  |
|-------------------|------------|----------|---------|
| Original Aircraft | \$72,402   | \$77,408 | \$5,006 |
| Boeing 757-200    | \$76,590   | \$79,788 | \$3,198 |
| Boeing 767-300    | \$87,342   | \$89,784 | \$2,442 |

### Connecting Flights



### Step 1. Decisions

|                  |          |          | Price | Demand | Seats to Sell | Flight Leg (capacity<br>166 on each) |
|------------------|----------|----------|-------|--------|---------------|--------------------------------------|
| $\left  \right $ | JFK<br>- | Regular  | 428   | 80     | ?             | 1 & 2                                |
| L                | LAX      | Discount | 190   | 120    | ?             | 1 & 2                                |
| {                | JFK      | Regular  | 642   | 75     | ?             | 1                                    |
| L                | -<br>DFW | Discount | 224   | 100    | ?             | 1                                    |
| <b>\</b>         | DFW      | Regular  | 512   | 60     | ?             | 2                                    |
| L                | -<br>LAX | Discount | 190   | 110    | ?             | 2                                    |

- Number of regular seats to sell
   R<sub>JFK-LAX</sub>, R<sub>JFK-DFW</sub>, R<sub>DFW-LAX</sub>
  - Number of discount seats to sell  $D_{
    m JFK-LAX}, D_{
    m JFK-DFW}, D_{
    m DFW-LAX}$

### Step 2. Objective

|          |          | Price | Demand | Seats to Sell | Flight Leg (capacity<br>166 on each) |
|----------|----------|-------|--------|---------------|--------------------------------------|
| JFK      | Regular  | 428   | 80     | ?             | 1 & 2                                |
| LAX      | Discount | 190   | 120    | ?             | 1 & 2                                |
| JFK      | Regular  | 642   | 75     | ?             | 1                                    |
| -<br>DFW | Discount | 224   | 100    | ?             | 1                                    |
| DFW      | Regular  | 512   | 60     | ?             | 2                                    |
| -<br>LAX | Discount | 190   | 110    | ?             | 2                                    |

• Maximize total revenue

 $428R_{
m JFK-LAX} + 190D_{
m JFK-LAX} + 642R_{
m JFK-DFW} + 224D_{
m JFK-DFW} + 512R_{
m DFW-LAX} + 190D_{
m DFW-LAX}$ 

### Step 3. Constraints

|          |          | Price | Demand | Seats to Sell | Flight Leg (capacity<br>166 on each) |
|----------|----------|-------|--------|---------------|--------------------------------------|
| JFK      | Regular  | 428   | 80     | ?             | 1 & 2                                |
| LAX      | Discount | 190   | 120    | ?             | 1 & 2                                |
| JFK      | Regular  | 642   | 75     | ?             | 1                                    |
| -<br>DFW | Discount | 224   | 100    | ?             | 1                                    |
| DFW      | Regular  | 512   | 60     | ?             | 2                                    |
| -<br>LAX | Discount | 190   | 110    | ?             | 2                                    |

- AA cannot sell more seats that the aircraft capacity

  - First leg JFK-DFW  $R_{\rm JFK-LAX} + D_{\rm JFK-LAX} + R_{\rm JFK-DFW} + D_{\rm JFK-DFW} \le 166$
  - Second leg DFW-LAX •

#### $R_{\rm JFK-LAX} + D_{\rm JFK-LAX} + R_{\rm DFW-LAX} + D_{\rm DFW-LAX} \le 166$

### Step 3. Constraints

|          |          | Price | Demand | Seats to Sell | Flight Leg (capacity<br>166 on each) |
|----------|----------|-------|--------|---------------|--------------------------------------|
| JFK      | Regular  | 428   | 80     | ?             | 1 & 2                                |
| LAX      | Discount | 190   | 120    | ?             | 1 & 2                                |
| JFK      | Regular  | 642   | 75     | ?             | 1                                    |
| -<br>DFW | Discount | 224   | 100    | ?             | 1                                    |
| DFW      | Regular  | 512   | 60     | ?             | 2                                    |
| -<br>LAX | Discount | 190   | 110    | ?             | 2                                    |

• AA cannot sell more seats than the demand

$$\begin{array}{ll} R_{\rm JFK-LAX} \leq 80 & D_{\rm JFK-LAX} \leq 120 \\ R_{\rm JFK-DFW} \leq 75 & D_{\rm JFK-DFW} \leq 100 \\ R_{\rm DFW-LAX} \leq 60 & D_{\rm DFW-LAX} \leq 110 \end{array}$$

### Step 4. Non-Negativity

|          |          | Price | Demand | Seats to Sell | Flight Leg (capacity<br>166 on each) |
|----------|----------|-------|--------|---------------|--------------------------------------|
| JFK      | Regular  | 428   | 80     | ?             | 1 & 2                                |
| LAX      | Discount | 190   | 120    | ?             | 1 & 2                                |
| JFK      | Regular  | 642   | 75     | ?             | 1                                    |
| -<br>DFW | Discount | 224   | 100    | ?             | 1                                    |
| DFW      | Regular  | 512   | 60     | ?             | 2                                    |
| -<br>LAX | Discount | 190   | 110    | ?             | 2                                    |

• AA cannot sell a negative number of seats

 $\begin{cases} R_{\rm JFK-LAX} \ge 0 & D_{\rm JFK-LAX} \ge 0 \\ R_{\rm JFK-DFW} \ge 0 & D_{\rm JFK-DFW} \ge 0 \\ R_{\rm DFW-LAX} \ge 0 & D_{\rm DFW-LAX} \ge 0 \end{cases}$ 

### Complex Network



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### Multiple Fare Classes

| Fare | Domestic<br>Upg.    | International<br>Upg.  | EQP | EQM | Mileage | Fare   | Domestic<br>Upg.       | International<br>Upg.                    | EQP | EQM | Mileag |
|------|---------------------|------------------------|-----|-----|---------|--|------------------------|--|-----|-----|--------|
| Α    | First Class         | First Class            | 1.5 | 1.0 | 150%    | Ν  | Yes                    | No                                       | .5  | 1.0 | 100%   |
| В    | Yes                 | Yes                    | 1.5 | 1.0 | 100%    | 0  | Yes*                   | No                                       | .5  | 1.0 | 100%   |
| С    | NA                  | Business<br>Upgrade    | N/A | N/A | N/A     | Р  | First Class<br>Fare    | First Class<br>Fare                      | 1.5 | 1.0 | 150%   |
| D    | NA                  | Business Fare          | 1.5 | 1.0 | 125%    | Q  | Yes                    | No                                       | .5  | 1.0 | 100%   |
| E    | No                  | No                     | N/A | N/A | N/A     | R  | NA                     | Business Class<br>Upgrade or<br>waitlist | N/A | N/A | N/A    |
| F    | First Class<br>Fare | First Class            | 1.5 | 1.0 | 150%    | S  | Yes*                   | No                                       | .5  | 1.0 | 100%   |
| G    | Government          | Government             | .5  | 1.0 | 100%    | Т  | Coach Award            | No                                       | N/A | N/A | N/A    |
|      |                     |                        |     |     |         | U  | NA                     | Business Class<br>Award                  | N/A | N/A | N/A    |
| н    | Yes*                | Waitlist only          | 1.0 | 1.0 | 100%    | V  | Yes*                   | No                                       | 1.0 | 1.0 | 100%   |
| L    | NA                  | Business Class         | 1.5 | 1.0 | 125%    | W  | Yes*                   | No                                       | 1.0 | 1.0 | 100%   |
| J    | NA                  | Business Class<br>Fare | 1.5 | 1.0 | 125%    | x  | First Class<br>Upgrade | Business Class<br>Upgrade                | N/A | N/A | N/A    |
| Κ    | Yes                 | No                     | 1.0 | 1.0 | 100%    | Υ  | Yes                    | Yes                                      | 1.5 | 1.0 | 100%   |
| L    | Yes                 | No                     | 1.0 | 1.0 | 100%    | Ζ  | First Class<br>Award   | NA                                       | N/A | N/A | N/A    |
| М    | Yes                 | No                     | 1.0 | 1.0 | 100%    | EQP: Elite-Qualifying Points / EQM: Elite-Qualifying Miles |                        |  |     |     |        |

### The Competitive Strategy of AA

• PEOPLExpress could not compete with AA's Ultimate Super Savers fares

"We were a vibrant, profitable company from 1981 to 1985, and then we tipped right over into **losing 50** million a month."

"We had been profitable from the day we started until American came at us with Ultimate Super Savers."

Donald Burr, CEO of PEOPLExpress (1985)

### The Competitive Strategy of AA

• Selling the right seats to the right customers at the right prices

**"Revenue management** is the single most important technical development in transportation management since we entered the era of airline deregulation."

"We estimate that revenue management has generated **\$1.4 billion in incremental revenue** in the last three years."

Robert Crandall, former CEO of AA (~1985)

### The Edge of Revenue Management

- Sabre Holdings
  - Built revenue management system for AA
  - As of November 2012, ranked 133 among America's largest private companies with \$3.15 billion in sales
  - 400 airlines, 90,000 hotels, 30 car-rental companies
- Today, companies prosper from revenue management
  - Delta airlines increased annual revenue by \$300 million
  - Marriott hotels increased annual revenue by \$100 million